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EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM:
STYLES AND VOICES WITHIN THE COMPUTER CULTURE
Sherry Turlde and Seymour Papert
I. EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLURALISM
The prevai ling image of the computer
represents it as a logical machine and computer
programming as a technical, mathematical activity.
Both the popular and technical culture have
constructed computation as the ultimate
embodiment of the abstract and formal . Yet the
computer's intellectual personality has another
side: our researchfinds diversityin the practice of
computing that isdenied by its social construction.
When we looked closely at progranuners in action
we saw [annal and abstract approaches; but we
also saw highly successful programmers in
relationships with their material that are more
reminiscent of a painter than a logician. They use
concrete and personal approaches to knowledge
that are far from the cultural stereotypes of formal
mathernatics.!
The diversity of approaches to programming
suggests that equal access to even the most basic
elements of computation requires accepting the
validityofmultiple ways ofknowing and thinking,
an epistemological pluralism. Here we use the
word epi stemology in a sense closer [Q Piaget's
than rothephilosopher's.Z In the traditional usage.
the goal of epistemology is to inquire into the
nature of knowledge and the conditions of its
validity; and only one form of knowledge. the
propositional. is taken to be valid} The step taken
by Piager in his definition of "episternologie
generique" was to eschew inquiry into the "true"
nature of knowledge in favor of a comparative
study of the diverse nature of different kinds of
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knowledge. in hiscase the kinds encountered inchildren
ofdifferentages.We differ from Piaget on an important
point. however. Where he saw diverse forms of
knowledge in terms of stages [Q a finite end point of
formal reason. we see different approaches to
knowledge as styles . each equally valid on its own
terms.
The barriers to acknowledging such pluralism
are great. historically rooted in domains that go far
beyond computation. The formal. propositional way
of knowing. has been recognized traditionally as a
standard. canonical style. Indeed. philosophical
epistemology has generally taken it as synonymous
with knowledge. Where concrete approaches to
knowledge have been recognized at all . it has most
often been as inferior ways of knowing. the kinds of
knowing adopted by necessity by those who have not
yet mastered the canonical style. Thus Jean Piaget
recognizes in young children ways of thinking that do
not conform to the canon but which are too coherent
and efficacious to be branded simply as " wrong: ' He
casts children's concrete thinking as a stage in a
progression [Q a formal style .4 Similarly. Claude Levi-
Strauss recognizes "bricolage," a "science of the
concrete:' but relegates it [Q primitive societies. a
manifestation of the " savage mind."S
More recently. concrete ways of thinking have
been recognized in contexts that arenot easilydismissed
as inferior. Ethnographers of science studying the
daily life of the laboratory have found that scientific
discoveries are made in a concrete. ad hoc fashion. and
only later recast into canonically acceptable
formalisms.v Scientific biography reveals that Nobel
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laureates relate to their materials in the concrete and
tact ile s ty le of Levi-Strau ss ' bricoleurs.?
Psychologists investigating adults' mathematical
thinking f ind that they use an effective and down -to-
earth style very different from the abstract and
formal math they were taught at school.8 Feminist
scholars have documented the power of concrete,
contextual reasoning in a wide range of domains.?
With such contributions has come a growing
convergence of intellectual commitments to a
revaluation of the concrete; but in general, the
ethnographers, psychologists, and femini st scholars
who have contributed to this revaluation have not
seen computation as relevant to their concern s. Here
we present evidence which points toward s the
possi bility of new intellectual alliances.
In our research on progranuning style s. the
computer has emerged as an important actor in the
revaluation of the concrete, a privileged medium for
the growth of alternative voices in dealing with the
world of formal systems . The conventio nal route
into formal systems, throu gh the manipulation of
abstract symbols. closesdoors that the computercan
open.The computer. with its graphics. its sounds, its
text and animation, can provide a pon of entry for
people whose chief ways ofrelating to the world are
through movement, intuition. and visua l impression.
At the heart of the new possibilities for the
appropriation offormal systems is the computational
object. on the border between an abstract idea and a
Concrete physical object. In the simplest case, a
comp utational object such as an icon moving on a
computer scree n can be defined by the most formal
of rules and is thus a mathematical construct. but at
the same time it is visible, almost tangible, and
allows a sense of direct manipulation that only the
encultured mathematician can feel in traditional
formal systems.Iv The computer has a theoretical
vocation : it can make the abstract concrete; it can
bring formality down-to-earth.
We have studied computers and the cultures
that grow up around them in a wide variety of
HMN Journal #7
settings ranging from video game arcades toresearch
laboratories of artificial intelligence. In this paper
we draw parti cularly on a long-term line of research
on how people enter the culture of programming.
Using clinical methods inspired by the Piagetian and
psychoanalytic traditions. we built up case studies of
children using computers in grade school settings
and college students taking a first progranuning
course. We saw many manifestations of the concrete
approach, favored in our study by more women than
men. We were also able to observe people reacting
poignantly to what they felt as a pressure to conform
to an officially imposed style.U Although the
computer as an expressive medium supports
epistemological pluralism, the computercultureofren
does not. Our data points to discrimination in the
computerculture that is determined not by rules that
keep people out but by ways of thinking that make
them reluctant to loin in. Moreover. the existence of
diverse styles of expert programming suppons the
idea that there can be differen t but equal voices even
where the formal has traditionallyappeared as almost
defi nitionally supreme : in mathematics and the
sciences.
Evelyn Fox Keller has remarked on thedifficulty
that people face when they try to understand what it
might mean to do science in anything other than the
formal and abstract canonical style. Describing such
a stylein the workofgeneticist Barbara McClintock,
Keller notes that this is the " less accessible aspect"
ofa scientist' s relationship to nature.12 In this essay
we describe people learning to program who are
having experiences with formal systems that are in
many ways analogous to those of the bricoleur
scientist or mathematician . One way the computer
contributes to the revaluation ofconcreteapproaches
in the domain of formal systems is by giving more
people access to (and an experience of) them.
The computer force s general que stions about
intellectual style to reveal an everyday face.U Even
schoolroom differences in how children program
computers raise issues that come up in a more
abstract fonn in scholarly debates about scientific
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objectivity. The computer makes ideas about non-
canonical scientific voices more concrete and
therefore appropriable because we can relate them
not only to the science ofthe scientists but toour own
thinking .
Here we focus on descriptions of a concrete
way of knowing; the formal. canonical style is well
known and well defended. Yet, our discussion of
concrete approaches is implicitly a discussion of
formal ones; it contributes to the deconstruction of
the canonical style as the only way to think. It also
situates it: the supervaluationofrhe formal approach
owes much of its strength within computation to the
suppon it gets in other intellectual domains. Fonnal
thinking, defined as synonymous with logical
thinking, has been given a privileged Status which
can be Challenged only by developing a respectful
understanding of other styles, where logic is seen as
a powerful instrument of thought but not as the " law
of thought." In this view, " logic is 0;) tap not on top."
As a carrier forpluralisric ideas about approaches to
knowledge, the computer may hold the promise of
. catalyzing change not only within the computer
culture but in the culture at large.
2. PERSONAL APPROPRIATION
Consider Lisa, eighteen, a first-year Harvard
University student in an introductory programming
course. Lisa fears that she will find the course
difficult because she is a poet , "good with words not
numbers." In high school, she had always scorned
teachers who had insisted that mathemat ics is a
language . Yet, now, her first encounter with the
computer has made Lisa ready to reconsider this
proposition and with it her characterization of herself
as someone "bad at math." Lisa starts well. surprised
to find herself easily in command of the course
material; but as the term progresses she reluctantly
decides that she "has to bea different kind ofperson
with the machine." The pressure todo so is not from
the computational medium. She says she can no
longer resist pressure from her teachers to think in
ways that are not her own.
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Lisa wants to manipulate computer language
the way she works with words as she writes a poem.
There, she says , she"feels her way from one word to
another: ' sculpting the whole . When she writes
poetry, Lisa experiences language as transparent,
she knows where all the elements are at every point
in the development of her ideas. She wants her
relationship to computer language to be similarly
transparent. When she builds large programs she
prefers to write her own. smaller. building block
procedures even though she could use prepackaged
ones from a program library; she resent s the opacity
of prepackaged programs. Her teachers chide her,
insisting that herdemand for transparency is making
her work more difficult; Lisa perseveres, insisting
that this is what it takes for her to feel comfonable
with computers .
Two months into the programming course,
Lisa' s effons to succeed are no longer directed
towards trying to fee! comfonable.She has been told
that the "right way" to do things is to control a
program throu gh planning and black-boxing. th
technique that lets you exploit opacity to pia
something large without knowing in advance ho
the detail s will be managed . Lisa recognizes the
value of these techniques - for someone else. She
struggle s against using them as the starting points
for her learning. Lisa ends up abandoning the fight,
doing things"theirway," and accepting the inevitable
alienation from her work. She call s her efforts to
become "another kind of person with the machine"
her "not-me strategy:' and begins to insist that the
computer is "ju st a tool." «It' s nothing much," she
says,"j ust a tool." Lisa ' s growing sense ofalienation
does not stem from an inability to cope wit~
programming but from her ability to handle it in a
way that comes into conflict with the computer
culture she has entered .
Aclassmate. Robin, is a pianist. Robinexplains
that she masters her music by perfecting the smallest
"little bits of pieces" and then building up. She
cannot progress until she understands the details of
eac h small pan. Robin is happiest when she uses thiS
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tried and true method with the computer, playing
with small computational elements as though they
were notes or musical phrases. Like Lisa. she is
frustrated with using prepackaged programs. She,
tOO, has been told her way is wrong: "I told my
teaching fellow 1 wanted to take it all apart and he
laughed. at me. He said it was a waste of rime. that
you shouldjust black box, thaI you shouldn 'tconfuse
yourself with what was going on at that low level."
Lisaand Robincame 10 iheprogrammingcourse
with anxieties about not belonging (fearing that the
computer belonged to male hackers who lived in "a
world apart") and their experiences in it only served
to validate their fears. 14 Although carefully
designed and imaginative. the Harvard University
course taught that there is only one right way to
approach thecomputer,3 waythatemphasizes control
through- structure and planning. There are many
virtues to this computational approach (it makes
sensewhendividingthelaboronalargeprogramming
project. for instance) but Lisa and Robin have
intellectual styles at odds with it. Lisa says she has
" turned herself into a different kind of person" in
order to perform and Robin says she has learned to
"fake it" Although both women got good grades in
this programming course, both have had to deny
who they are in order to succeed.
Lisa and Robin's experiences make it clear that
the computer can be a partner in a great diversity of
relationships, that the computer is an expressive
medium that different people can make their own in
their own way . Yet those who wish to approach the
computer in a non-canonical way are discouraged
by the dominant computer culture, eloquently
expressed in the ideology of the Harvard University
COurse. They are asked to change their style to suit
the fashion when they begin to interact with the
official computer world, committed to a formal,
rule-driven, hierarchical approach 10programming.1S
Like Lisa and Robin, their exclusion from the
computer culture is perpetuated not by rules that
keep them out, but by ways of thinking that make
them reluctant to join in. They are not computer
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phobic. They do not need to stay away because of
fear or panic; but they are computer reticent, They
want to stay away because the computer has come [0
symbolize an alien way of thinking. They learn to
get by and to keep a certain distance. One of its
manifestations is the way they neutralize thecomputer
through language wbich denies the possibility of
using it creatively (recall how Lisa dismisses it as
"just a tool").
In this way, discrimination in the computer
culture takes the form of discrimination against
approaches to knowledge, most strikingly against
the one preferred by Lisa and Robin, an approach we
call bricolage.
3. BRICOLAGE
Levi-Strauss used the term bricolagetocontrast
the analytic methodology of Western science with
what he called a "scienceoftheconcrete"in primitive
societies.Jv'Ibe bricoleurs he describes do not move
abstractly and hierarchically from axiom to theorem
to corollary. Bricoleurs construct theories by
arranging and rearranging, by negotiating and
renegotiating with a set of well known materials.
Lev i-Strauss' descriptions of the two scientific
approaches, divested of his efforts t~ localize them
culturally, suggest the variety of ways that people
approach computers. For some people in our study,
what is exciting about computers is working within
a rule-driven system that can be mastered in a top-
down, divide-and-conquer way This is the
" planner' s" approach taught in the Harvard
programming course. This approach decrees that the
right way to solve a programming problem is to
dissect it into separate parts and design a set of
modular solutions that will fit the parts into an
intended whole. Some programmers work this way
because their teachers or employers insist that they
do . For others, it is a preferred approach; to them, it
seems natural to make a plan, divide the task, use
modules and subprocedures.
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Lisa, Robin, and others like them in our study
offer examples ofa very different style. They are not
drawn to structured programming; their work at the
computer is marked by a desire to play with the
elements of the program, to move them around
almost as though they were material elements - the
words in a sentence, the notes in a musical
composition, the elements of a collage.
The bricoleurresembles the painter who stands
back between brushsrrokes.Iooks at the canvas, and
only after this contemplation, decides what to do
next. For planners, mistakes are missteps; for
bricoleurs they are the essence of a navigation by
mid-course corrections. For planners, a program is
an instrument for premeditated control; bricoleurs
have goals, but set out to realize them in the spirit of
a collaborative venture with the machine. For
planners, getting a program to work is like "saying
one's piece"; for bricoleurs it is more like a
conversation than a monologue. In cooking, this
would bethe style of those who do not follow recipes
and instead make a series of decisions according to
taste. While hierarchy and abstraction are valued by
the structured programmers' planner's aesthetic,
bricoleurprogrammers,likeLevi-Strauss' bricoleurs,
prefer negotiation and rearrangement of their
materials.
For instance, Alex, nine years old, is a classic
bricoleur. He attends the Hennigan Elementary
School in Boston, the scene of an experiment in
using computers across the curriculum. There,
studentsworkwith Logoprogramming andcomputer
controlled Lego construction materials .The work is
both frequent enough (at least an hour a day) and
open-ended enough for differences in styles to
emerge.
When working with Lego materials andmotors,
most children make something move by attaching
wheels to amotor that makes them tum. They see the
wheels and motor through abstract concepts ofwhat
they are for: the wheels roll, the motor rums. Alex
goes a different route . He looks at the objects
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concretely, without the filter of abstractions. He
turns the Lego wheels on their sides to make flat
shoes for his robot and harnesses one of the motor's
most tangible features: thefact thatit vibrates. When
a machine vibrates it tends to travel, something
nonnaUy to be avoided. When Alex runs into this
phenomenon, his response is to make his robot
(stabilized byits flat"wheel shoes") vibrate and thus
move forward. When Alex programs in Logo he
likes to keep things similarly concrete.
Learners are usually introduced to Logo
programming through the "turtle," an icon on a
computer screen that can be commanded (Q move
around the screen and leave a trace as it goes. So, for
example, the turtle can be told to move forward a
hundred steps and turn ninety degrees with the
commands FORWARD 100 RIGHT 90. Four such
commands would have the tunle drawing a square.
Programming occurs when a set of commands such
as REPEAT 4 [FORWARD 100 RIGHT 901. are
defined asa procedure:TO SQUARE. Alternatively.
a suhprocedure TO SIDE might be defined and
repeated four times.
Alex wants to draw a skeleton. Structured
programming views a computer program as a
hierarchical sequence. Thus a structured program
TO DRAW SKELETON might bemade up of four
suhprocedures: TO HEAD, TO BODY.TO ARMS.
TO LEGS. just as TO SQUARE could be built up
from repetitions of a subprocedure TO SIDE. Alex
rebels against dividing his skeleton program into
subprocedures; his program inserts bones one by
one, marking the place for insertion with repetitions
.. of instructions . One of the reasons often given for
using subprocedures is economy in the number of
instructions. Alex explains that doing it his way was
"worth theextra typing" becausethe phraserepetition
gave him a" better sense of where Iam in the pattern"
of the program. He had considered the structured
approach, but prefers his own style for aesthetic
reasons: " It has rhythm," he says. In his opinion,
using subprocedures for parts of the skeleton is tOO
arbitrary , preemptive, and abstract. "It makes you
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decide how to divide up the body and perhaps you
would change your mind abou t what goes together
with what. Like, I might decide to think about the
two hands together instead of each hand with the
arms! '17
In his own way. Alex has resisted the pressure
to believe the general superior to the specific or the
abstract superior to theconcrete. For Alex. thinking
about handsas a subset of arms is toofar away from
the reality of real hands.just as taking a motor that
was most striking as a vibrating machine and using
it to tum wheels in the standard fashion was too far
away from the real motor he had before him. While
the structured programmer starts with a clear plan
defined in abstract terms, Alex lets the product
emerge through a negotiation between himself and
his material.
Anne, also nine years old. is another bricoleur
programmer. Her favorite hobby is pain ting and she
has become expert at using sprites in programs that
produce striking visual effects.IS A sprite is a
second Logo icon, a turtle that can be set in motion.
Once you give a sprite a speed and a heading, it
moves with that state of uniform motion until
something is done to change it, just like an object
obeying Newton's first law.
In one of Anne's programs, a flock of birds
(each bird built with a sprite) flies through the sky,
disappears over the horizon, and reappears some
other place and time. Ifall the birds were red. then it
would be ea sy to make themdisappearand reappear.
The command SETCOLOR :INV ISIBLE wou ld get
rid of them and SETCOLOR :RED would make
them reappear. Yet Anne wants the birds to have
different colors, and so making the birds reappear
with their original color is more complicated.
One method for achieving this end calls for an
algebraic style of thinking: you make the program
Store each bird's original color as the value of a
Variable, then you change all colors 10 invi sible and
recall the appropriate variable when the bird is to
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reappear. Anne knows how 10 use this algorithmic
method, but prefers one thai allows her to turn
programming into the manipulation of familiar
objects. As Anne programs, she uses analogies with
ttaditional an materials. When you want to hide
something on a canvas, you paint itout, you cover it
over with something that looks like the background.
Anne uses this technique to solve her programming
problem. She lets each bird keep its color, but she
makes her program hide it by placing a screen over
it. Anne designs a sprite that will screen the bird
when she doesn 'I want it seen, a sky-colored screen
that makes the bird disappear. Anne is programming
a computer, but she is thinking like a painter.
Thinking like a painter does not prevent Anne
from contributing a sign ificant technical innovation
to her founh grade computer class. She is familiar
with the ideaofusing two sprites to form acompound
object. Her classmates and teachers have always
done this by putting the sprites side by side. Anne's
program is like theirs in using two sprites, one for the
screen, one for the bird, but she places the spri tes on
top of each other so that they occupy the same space.
Instead of thinking ofcompound objects as a way of
gettinga picture to be bigger, she thinks ofcompound
objects asa way ofgetting sprites toexhibita greater
complexity of behavior, an altogether more subtle
concept.
Thus, Anne's level of technical expenise is as
dazzling in its manipulation of ideas as in its visual
effects. She has become familiar with the idea of
data structures by inventing a new one - her screened
bird. She has learned her way around a set of
mathematical ideas through manipulating angles,
shapes, rates, and coordinates in her program. As a
bricoleur, her path into this technical knowledge is
not through structura l design , but through the
pleasures of letting effects emerge.
As in the case of Alex, Anne does not write her
program in "sections" that are assembled into a
product. She makes a simple working program and
shape s it gradually by successive modifications. She
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starts with a single black bird. She makes it fly. She
gives it color. Each step is a small modification to a
working program that she has in hand . If a change
does not work , she undoes it with another small
change. She " sculpts." At each stage of the process,
she has a fully working program, not a part but a
version of the final product.
Anne is perfectly ca pable of prod ucing a
program with well delineated subprocedures,
although her way of creating them has little in
common with the planner' s approach .tv Devotees
of structured programming would frown on Anne 's
style. From their point of view, Anne should design
a computational objec t (for example, her bird) with
all the required qualities built into it. She should
specify, in advance, what signals will cause her bird
to change color, disappear, reappear, and fly . One
cou ld then forget about "how the bird works"; it
would be a black box. Anne's work dramatizes the
feature of bricolage that was so salient for Lisa and
Robin: the desire for transparency. Like Lisa and
Robin, she enjoys keep ing open the possibility of
renegotiating their exact fonn. This means stayi ng
in touch with that fonn at all times. The bricoleu rs in
our study tend to prefer the transparent style, planners
the opaque, but the program 's authorship is a critical
variable in this preference. Planners want to bring
their own programs to a point where they can be
black-boxed and made opaque, while bricoleurs
prefer to keep them transparent; but when dealing
with programs made by others, the situation is
reversed. Now, the bricoleurs are happy to get to
know a new object by interacting with it, learning
about it through its behavior the way you would
learn about a person, while (he planners usually find
this intolerable.The planners' moreanalytic approach
demands knowing how the program works before
interacting with it. They demand the assurance that
comes from transparent understanding, from
dissection and demonstration.
Despite the dominant ideology of thecomputer
cul ture which privileges the structured, hierarchic al,
planner's style, Anne's case makes it clear that the
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difference between planners and bricoleurs is not in
quali ty of prod uct, it is in the process of creating it.
In describi ng bricoleur programmers, we have made
analogies to cooks and painters. Bricoleurs are also
like writers who don't use an outline but Start with
one idea, associ ate to another, and find a connection
with a third . In the end, an essay "grown" through
negotiation and association is not necessarily any
less elegant or easy to read than one filled in from an
outline, just as the final program prod uced by a
bricoleur can be as elegant and organized as one
written with (he top-down approach.
Do programmers graduate from bricolage when
they develop greater expe rtise? Will Anne become
a structured programmer in junior high ? Our
observation s suggest that with experience, bricoleurs
reap the benefits of their long exp lorations, so that
they may appear more "decisive" and like planners
when they program on familiar terrain. Also, of
course, they get better at "faking it." Still, the
negotiating style resurfaces when they confront
something challenging or are asked torry something
new. Brico lage is a way to organize work. It is nota
stage in a progression to a superior form . Interviews
with computer scientists and their graduate students
turned up highly skilled bricoleurs, most of them
aware that their style was "countercultural. " Indeed,
there is a culture of programming virtuosos, the
hacker culture, that would recognize many elements
of the bricolage sty le as their own.
Withinfeminist scholarship there isa substantial
body of literature that challenges the notion that
human reason best expresses itself within terms of
Western male gende r norms.20 For example, Carol
Gilligan 's work on moral reasoningcalls into question
the idea of one privileged, mature way of thinki ng.
Gilligan 's description of two approaches to moral
reasoning is analogous in to ourcontrast between the
formal , canonical approach to program ming and the
concrete style of the bricoleur.2l In the first.justice
is like a mathematical principle: to solve a problem
you set up the right algorithm, the right black 00%,
you crank the handle, and the answer comes OuLZ2
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In the second, a contextualized argument is like a
concrete argument, one needs to stay in touch with
the inner workings of the arguments, with the
relationships and possibly shifting alliances of a
group of actors whose interests need to be negotiated .
Despite Anne' s high level of achievement,
theori sts ofstructured programming would criticize
her style for the same kind of reasons that a stage
theorist of moral development would classify the
most impressively articulate contextual thinker at a
lower intellectual level then his or her "formal"
colleague. In both cases, criticism would center on
the fact that neither is prepared to take the final step
to abstraction. Gilligan challenges this standard
hierarc hy; she uses her o bserva tions of moral
reasoning through concrete situations to reject
Lawre nce Kohlberg ' s stage theory with its
determinate end point to development, an end point
in abs tract, universal principles.23 If one branc h of
the development ofmoral reasoning moves towards
the primacy ofUjustice," of the formal and analytic,
Gill igan insists on equal respect for a di fferent
bra nch o f development which lead s to wa rd
increasingly sophisticated ways of thinking about
mor ality in concrete terms of care through
relationship and connection.
Gilligan is concerned with both morality and
epistemology when she says: "the moral problem
[for women] arises from conflicting responsibilities
rather than from competing righ ts and requires for
its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual
and narrative rather than formal and abstract."24
Her language expresses a primary concern with the
character of the morality which, as she says, requires
a cenain mode of thinking. This emphasis on the
character of the morality (ra ther than the mode of
thinking) is even more marked in recent writin g
where she redescribes Kohlberg's theory as being
about only one side ofmoral rea soning. In this view,
Kohlberg is talking about justice, thus leaving the
other side of morality, namel y care, to her.25
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This compromise which splits off the COlUenJ
of moraljudgments from themode of thinking about
them blunts the force ofGilligan's observations as a
chaIJenge to something more general than moral
reasoning ; but that challenge is central to our
argument. Kohlberg's theory of the developmentof
moral judgment mirrors Piaget' s theory of the
development ofintelligenceperse.Both express the
value-laden perspective on intellectual growth that
has dominated Western philosophy. Piaget sees a
progression from egocentric beginnings to a final,
"formal stage" when propositional logic and the
hypothetico-deductive methcdvliberate" intelligence
from the need for concrete situations to mediate
thinking.26 In this vision, mature thinking is abstract
thinking. We disagree: for us, formal reasoning is
not a stage, but a style. Gilligan ' s materials on the
countercultural style of moral reasoning. like the
countercuItural style in programming, challenges
the existence of hierarchical stages: for although
Piager would place the "concrete" Anne squarely in
the prefonnal stage, her level of achievement
undennines his assumptions about the superiority of
the analytic and formal,
Thus, observation of programmers at work
calls into question deeply entrenched assumption
about the classification and value of different ways
ofknowing. Itprovides examples of the validity and
power of concrete thinking in situations that are
traditionally assumed to demand the abstract It
supports a perspective which encourages looking
for psychological and intellectual development
within rather than beyond the concrete and suggests
the need for closer investigation of the diversity of
ways in which the mind can use objects to think with
rather than the rules of logi c.
4. OBJECTS
Sooner or later in building objects with Lege,
students at the Henniga n School where we met Alex
run into the need for gears.27 Looking at their work
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provides a good example of alternate styles applied
to working with the same problem, formal styles that
use rules and concrete styles that use objects.
The motors in the construction se t tum at a high
speed with low torque. A car built by attaching these
motors directly to the wheels will go very fast, but
will be so underpowered that the slightest slope or
obstruction will cause it to stall. The solution to the
problem with Lego cars is the same as that adopted
by designers of real cars : use gears . Yet in order to
use them effectively, children need to understand
something about gear ratios.
If a smaIl gear drives a larger gear, the larger
gear will tum more slowly and with greater torque.
It is the relative and not the absolute size of the two
gears that counts. But when we interview children ,
we find that some of them reason as ifthe size of only
one gear matters, as if they were followin g a set of
rules such as "large gears are slow and strong" and
"small gears are fast and weak." With out the notion
of relative size, suchrules fail. Other children, and in
our study, predominantly the girls, are less articulate
and more physical in their explanations. They
squirm and twist their bodies as they try 10explain
how they figure things out: and they get the right
answer.28
Theori sts who look at intellectual development
as the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated rules
would say that children run into problems if the rules
they have built are not yet good enou gh.29 The idea
of "closenes s to objects" enables us to consider a
different kind of theory . Our observations suggest
that the children who did so well did not have better
rules, but a tendency to see things in terms of
relationships rather than properties, access to a style
of reason ing which allowed them to imagine
them selves " inside the sys tem." They used a
relationship to the gears to help them think through
a problem.
This "reasoning from within" may not be
adequate for all problems about gears, but for the
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kind of problem encountered by the children in our
project, it was not only adequate, but much less
prone to the errors produced by a too-simple set of
rules. Relational thinking puts you at an advantage:
you do not suffer disaster if the rule is not exactly
right.
We have defined bricolage as a style of
organizing work that invites descriptions such as
negotiationa1 rather than planned in advance, what
Warren McCulloch called "heterarchical" rather
than hierarchical.30 The story of the children and
their gears serves to introduce another characteristic
displayed by many bricoleur programmers. We call
this characteristic pruximality or closeness to the
object. There is little distance between Anne and her
computatio nal objects. Like the children, who
"reasoned from within" with the gears, Anne
psychologically places herself in the same space as
the sprites. She experiences her screens and birds as
tangible, sensuous, and tactile . She is down there, in
with the sprites, playing with them like objects in a
collage. When she talks about them her gestures
with hand and body show her moving with and
among them. When she speaks of them she uses
language such as"}move here." Theobjectrelations
school of psychoanalysis focuses on the way
development progresses by a process of
internalization of the things and people of the world.
They come to live within us; they become the objecrs
with which we think.31 When psychoanalysts talk
about "objects" they usually mean people.32 Here
we extend the idea of internalized "objects to think
with" to the domain of everyday relationships with
an ifacts. It is not enough to ask whether individuals
"like" or "don ' t like" to program because that puts
the question on too high a level of generalization.
"Liking"toprogramdependsonforgingapersonally
meaningful relationship with a computational object.
a relationship that "fits." In forging this relationship.
(here are several dimensions of choice. People call
choose among computational objects. For example.
in the version of Logo used by Anne there was a
choice between sprites and turtles, Some prefer the
turtle, its static nature, the fineness in the way ir
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draws. Forothers, these same qualities are reason s to
reject -the turtle as constraining, even unpleasant.
They prefer the sprites, which move with flash and
speed.
People can (and do) choose different ways of
approaching the same object. Computational object s,
like turtlesand sprites standon the boundary between
the physical and the abstract You can see them ,
move them, put one on top of another. Yet. they are
mathematicalconstructions. Canonical programmers
treat a sprite more like an abstract entity, a Newtonian
panicle, while bricoleur programmers treat it more
like a physical object. a dab of paint or a cardboard
cut-our.
Computational objects offer a great deal to
those whose approach to knowledge requires a close
relationship to an object experienced as tactile and
co ncrete. Some people are comfortable with
mathematical exercises that manipul ate symbols on
q uadri ll e-ru led paper. Fo r many others ,
computationalobjects offera physical pathofaccess
to the world of form al systems. For them, the
ambivalent nature of computational objects may
make possible a first access to mathematics.33
Feminist critics have related the standard notion of
scientific objectivity to the social construction of
gender:objectivity in the sense ofdistancing the self
from the object of study is culturally constructed as
male, just as male is culturally constructed as
distanced and objective. From this point of view,
Anne's proximal styJe iscounterculrural, reminiscent
of Kell er's description of geneticist Barbara
McClintock's intimate relationship to the objects of
her scientific study. For McClintock. the practice of
science was essentially a conversation with her
materials. The more she worked with neurospora
chromosomes (so small that others had been unable
to identify them), "the bigger [they) got, and when I
was really working with them I wasn't outside, I was
down there. J was pan of the system . J actually felt
as if I were right down there and these were my
friends.... As you look at these things, they become
pan of you and you forget yourself ."34
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Alex and Anne relate to computational objects
much as McCli'ltock related to chromosomes as
doesa successful computer science graduate student
Lorraine who explains how she uses "thinking about
what the program feels like inside" to break through
difficult problems."Forappearancessake," she wants
to "look like I'm doing what everyone else is doing,
but I'm doing that with only a small pan of my mind.
The rest of me is imagining what the components
feel like. It's like doing my pottery." This is in sharp
contrast to programmers in the structured, canonical
style who use their favorite device of black- boxing
as a way to maintain distance. The idea of the black
box, designed not to be touched. mediates between
the structured (planning) style of organizing work
and their relationship to computational objects.
Structured programmers are not among the sprites ,
they act on the sprites.
The contemptuous comment of one founh-
grade boy who overheard a classmate talking about
"being a sprite'twhen he programscan beinterpreted
from this point of view. "Th at' s baby talk," he said.
" I am not in the computer. I'm just making things
happen there: ' The remark reflects an insistence on
boundaries and the development of a world view
that will fall easily into line with the canonical,
objective science whose gender-b~ed meanings
Keller has delineated.
In our research we find a close relationship
between bricolage, a style of organizing work, and
proximality, a style of relating to the objects of
work.35 Our data is consisrenrwith a model ofstyles
as clusters of characteristics in which bricolage and
proximalityfonn the nucleusofonec1uster("concrete
thinking") and planning and distality the nucleus of
the other ("fonnal thinking"). These clusters are
ideal types: our contention is not that the attributes
in each cluster are exactly correlated but that each
has internal coherency in the way that a stable
culture is coherent.
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So for example, closeness to objects tends to
support a concrete style of rea soning, a preference
for using objects to think with, rod a bias against the
abstract formulae that maintain reason at a distance
from its objects.Conversely, adistanced relationship
with objects supports an analytic, rule and plan
oriented style. Our theoretical conjecture is that
degree of closeness to objects has developmental
primacy; it comes first. The child fonns either a
proximal or distant relationship to the world of
things. The tendency to use the abstract and analytic
or concrete and negotiational style of thinking
follows.
Althoughcloseness to objectsfavorscontextual
and associarional styles of work, it does not exclude
the possibility of using a hierarchical one. Planning
is not always an expression of personal style. It can
be acquired as a skill, sometimes because it is
needed to get a panicular job done. sometimes as a
facade to hide rather than express individuality.
Indeed, our data suggest that we may be
underestimating the degree of association between
prcximality and bricolage. Some people adopt
elements of the canonical style because they feel a
social pressure to do so. In order to attract less
negative attention, Lisa said that she decided to be a
different kind of person, i.e., more of a "planner,"
Robin says she "fakes it" and forces herself to black
box. Lorraine affects the discourse of a distanced
style while something very different is going on in
her head. Some bricoleurs respond to the dominant
ethos of the computer culture by entering into an
inauthentic relationship with the computer. Thiscan
lead to a paradoxical reaction: frustra ted bricoleurs
appear at first sight to beextremelyrigid " planners."
Some turn to a "cookbook" approach - like when
in third grade, we were told to divide fractions by
turning "t he second fraction" upside down. When
denied a chance to do their "real thinking," they turn
toroles thatdo not require them to think at all. People
like Lisaand Robin"escape toconformity," areaction
that muffles the manifestation of their different
voices in computing. Nevertheless, those voices are
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there. Recall the graduate student Lorraine, who
says she tries "to look like I'm doing what everyon e
else is doing ," in order to preserve "appearances."
Her style is hidden beneath her effons to fit in.
In our culture, the structured, plan-oriented,
abstract thinkers do not only share a style but
constitute an epistemological elite. We have never
seen a case in which someone claims to have felt
pressure to move away from the canonical style.
Thus, since the phenomenon of" faking it" goes only
in onedirection, we conclude that true occurrence of
the bricoleur/proximal combination are even more
common than our raw count.
Another attribute associated with proximality
and bricolage when working with computers is a
tendency to anthropomorphize, to refer to the system
as though it had human qualities . Th
anthropomorphi zation extend s fro m the
computational objects ("That sprite doesn't want to
do what I tell it now") to the computer itself. Anne.
for instance, has no doubt that computers have
psychologies:"they think," she says«butcan't really,
have emotions." She believes, however, that the
computer has preferences. "H e would like it if you
did a pretty program." When it come s to technical
things, Anne assumes [he computer has an aesthetic
"I don ' t knowif he would rather have the program be
very complicated or very simple." Anne knows tha
the computer is just a machine, but she sees i
nonetheless as a male companion, if only a limited!
one. Anthropomorphization, both of the compute
system and its pans, does not follow from lack 0
technical expertise. It is a stylistic preference.Jf
Very young children are in fact uncertain
whether computers should be counted as alive or not
alive, and argue the question hotly, debating the
computer's aliveness on the basis of its psychology,
its intentions, consciousness. and feelings. By age
ten, most are sure that the computer is not actually
alive. However, at this point, some children, like:
Anne, continue to behave with and talk about the
computer as if it were sentient. They brag that it is
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helping them or complain that it is not. In this, they
are not showing confusion about biology. They do
not think that the computer is alive the wayan animal
is, rather that it has a "kind of life," the kind of life
appropriate to a computer: it thinks.37
Others have a very different reaction. Once
theyarenc longerperplexedbywhetherthemachine
might actuallybe alive biologically, they shy away
from anthropomorphization. When they complain
about the computer, they do so in objective terms: it
is too slow, itdoes not have enough memory. Talking
about the computer usually means talking about
technical details.
Lise Motherwell, a researcher at the Hennigan
school, did an intensive investigation of eight fifth
grade st~ents.Motherwell found she could describe
children' s stances towards the anthropomorphization
of the computer by distinguishing two styles:
relational and environmental. Relational children,
like those we are calling proximal thinkers, treat the
computer as much like a person as they can, while
environmental children, analogous to those we
describe as preferring a distanced approach, treat it
like a thing .
Once they have placed the computer in the not-
alive category, the environmental children tend to
settle with relief into treating it as a thing . This helps
them to appropriate it through a relati onship that
involves distance, objectivity, and control. The
relational children, once having settled the question
of biological alivenes s, get more comfortable with
the machine by making it an interactive panner. In
the computer they have found something in the
domain of formal systems to which they can relate
with informality. Three out of the four girls in
Motherwell's study were relational; three OUt of the
four boys environmenta1.38
InMotherwell'sstudy.asinthestudyofchildren
and gears, gender seems implicated in, but not a
definitive influence on , style, co nsis tent with
Observationsofadult computer cultures where some
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men are alienated from the dominant engineering
style and many women work creatively within it.
Again, as in our examples of Anne, Alex, Lisa,
Robin, and Lorraine, the concrete style did not imply
a lower quality of work. Concrete, proximal gear
builders didJUSt as well and in some cases benerthan
theformal thinkers; childrenwhoanthropomorphize
the computer are no Jess technically sophisticated
than those who do not. The degree of concrete,
proximal, and anthropomorphic thinking does not
reflect expertise but preferred approach to
knowledge.
5. GENDER, CLOSENESS, AND CONFLICT
Several intellectual perspectives suggest thar
women would feel more comfortable with a
relational, interactive, and connected approach to
objects and men with a more distanced stance,
planning, commanding, and imposing principles on
them.39 Indeed, we have found that many women do
have a preference for attachment and relationship
withcomputers and computational objects as a means
of access to formal systems. Yet in our culture
computers are associated with a construction of
science that Stresses aggression, domination, and
competition. The cultural construction of science
leads to a conflict that considerably complicates our
story of how women appropriate technology, In the
case of computation this conflict is particularly
acute. From its very foundations, science hasdefined
its way of knowing in a gender-based language.
Francis Bacon 's image of the (male) scientistputting
the (female) nature "on the rack," underscores the
way objectivity has been constructed not only in
terms of the distance of the knower from nature, but
in terms of an aggressive relationship towards it (or
rather towards her). And from its very foundations,
objectivity in science has been engaged with the
langua ge of power, not only over nature, but over
people and organizations. Such associations have
spread beyond professional scientific communities;
aggression has become pan ofa widespread cultural
understanding of what it means to behave in a
scientific way. Its methods are expected to involve
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"demolishing" an argument and "knocking it down"
to size. Here the object of the blows is not a female
nature but a male scientific opponent If science is
first a rape. it is then a due1.40
The traditional discourse of computation has
not been exempt from these connotations. Programs
and operating systems are "crashed" and "killed."
We write this paper on a computer whose operating
system asks if it should "abon" an instruction it
cannot "execute."ln our ethnographic studies of the
social worlds that grow up around computing, we
have found that this is a style of discourse that few
women fail to note. Thus, women are too often faced
with the not necessarily conscious choice of putting
themselves at odds either with the cultural
associations of the technology or with the cultural
constructions of being a woman .
When Lisa had a confrontation with her
instructor about the proper way to program the
computer culture and its canonical epistemology
were represented by a person in authority with
whom she argued. In other cases the tension comes
from fears of what people might think rather than a
confrontation with what someone actually thinks.
Lorraine who programs by imagining "what the
components feel like" ends her description of her
programming style by adding : " Keep this
anonymous. I know it sounds stupid:' In both these
reactions there is a tension between an individual
and an outside agency; but the conflict is internalized:
the computer culture alienates by putting one in
conflict with oneself.
When Lisa first found herselfdoing well in her
programming course, she found it "scary" because
she felt she needed to protect herselffrom the idea of
"being a computer science type." In high school,
Lisa saw young men around her turning to computers
as a way to avoid people: "They took the computers
and made a world apan." Lisa describes herself as
"turning off' her natural abilities in mathematics
that would have led her to the computer. "I didn 't
care if I was good at it I wanted to work in worlds
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where languages had moods and connected you with
people ." Although Robin had gone through most of
her life as a musician practicing piano eight hours a
day, she, too, had fears about "guys who established
relationships" with the computer. "To me. it sounds
gross to talk about establishing a relationship with
the computer. I don't like establishing relationships
with machines. Relationships are for people."
In the vehemence with which many women
insist on the computer's neutrality, on its being
nothing more than a mere tool, there may be
something more subtle going on than a clash between
culture and personal style- a clash between personal
style and sense ofself. Many women may be fighting
against having a close relationship to a computer.
For some, like Lorraine, it could be because they
want to belong to the dominant computer culture.
But for others, the experience of closeness to the
object is a source of conflict with themselves.
Lisa, like Anne. placed herself in the space of
the computational objects she worked with and she
tended to anthropomorphize, responding to the
computer as though it had (at least) an intellectual
personality. In Lisa's case , her own style came to
offend her because it had led her to what she
experienced as a too-close relationship with a
machine. When Lisa began programming she saw
herselfas communicating with the computer, but the
metaphor soon distressed her. "The computer isn't a
living being and when I think about communicating
with it. well that 's wrong. There's a cenain amount
of feeling involved in the idea of communication
..and I was looking for that from the computer." She
looked for it and she frightened herself. ..It was
horrible . I was becoming involved with a thing. I
identified with how the computer was going through
things."
In our research we find that women expres
such sentiments with particularurgency. We observe
that a conflict fuels their convictions. In many cases.
they are most comfonable with a style of thinking ill
which they get close to the objects of thought. Th<
HMN Joumal 11
computer offers them such objects; but the closer
they get to them the more anxious they feel. One
remedy for their anxiety is denial. The more these
people become involved with the computer, the
more they insist that it is only a neutral tool. Again,
their assertion is belied by the vehemence with
which it is expressed.
Lisa's conflict with her instructor would be
resolved in principle by a greater tolerance for her
way of thinking; but addressing internal conflicts
about being close to computers requires more than
tolerance. It requires profound changes in the culture
that surrounds the computer. For instance. if the
computer is a tool, and of course it is , is it more like
a hammer or more like a harpsichord?
The musician Robin is not di stressed by her
close relationship with her piano which is also a
machine. Lisa who finds attachment to the computer
"unnatural" is not upset by her passion for the
beautiful, heavy antique ink pens with which she
writes . If Lisa had been in music schoo l, it is most
likely that she. like Robin, would not experience as
threatening her sense of communicating with her
instrument or her emotional involvement with it.
Music students live in a culture that over time has
slowly grown a language and models for close
relationships with music machines.The harpsichord,
like the visual arti sts' pencils. brushes and paints, is
a tool , and yet we understand that arti sts ' encounters
with these can (and indeed. will most probably) be
close , sensuous, and relational. Indeed , the best
artists will develop highly personal styles of working
with them
The development of a new computer culture
would require more than environments where there
is perm ission to work with high ly personal
app roaches. It would requ ire a new social
construction of the computer, with a new set of
intellectual and emotional values more like those
applied to harpsichords than hammers.41 Since
increasingly computers are the tool s people use to
write, to design, to play with ideas and shapes and
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images, they should be addressed with a language
that reflec ts the full range of human experiences and
abilities. Changes in this direction would necessitate
the reconstruction ofourcultural ass umptions abou t
formal logic as the "law of thought" This point
brings us full circle to where we began. with the
assertion that epistemological pluralism is anecessary
condition for a more inclusive computer culture.
7. ROADBLOCKS AND OPENINGS FOR
CHANGE
While the computer suppons epistemological
pluralism, the computer culture has not. In some
ways, though, the computer culture is catching up
with the potential of the computer. In particular,
si gnifi cant openings for change within the
technological culture come from a new emphasis on
computational objects which is making itself felt in
domains as diverse as debates about which personal
computers are the best and how to build anificial
brains.
Its simplest manifestation is the fashion for
using icons to control personal computers. In a
traditional IBM-style computer system control is
through typing instructions. In an iconic system, the
same effects are achieved by moving screen symbols.
The current technology for the act of moving
something ona screen falls shon of what thecomputer
industry expects to provide quite soon, but existing
systems. such as the Macintosh's "mouse" and touch
sensitive screens already give a tactile sense that
recall sAnne'sexperienceofprogrammingascollage.
Even superficial use of icons is enough to
transform the perception of the computer by people
who are using it in computationally simple ways .
For example. it is commonplace knowledge that
manywriters who began to use compurersreluctantly,
as a necessary evil, now find they have friendlier
relationship s mediated by the icon s, the mouse, and
the cozier appearance of a Macintosh. Although
these panicular warmer relationships do not involve
programming, their influence may mean that the
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next generation of people like Lisa and Robin will
come to programming courses with a different sense
of who "owns" the computer.
A multiplicity oftechnical methods does not by
itself lead to pluralism. It can simply lead to
competition. to which the computer industry is
scarcely averse, nor are those computer users who
seem to enjoy conversations that engage them in
heated debate about the merits of their favorite
system. It is only when we understand the computer
as a projective screen for different approaches to
knowledge that we can listen to these conversations
as a striving for pluralism. Different people are
comfonable with different systems. When people
fight about the IBM versus the Macintosh, what they
may betrying to do is defend their intellectual styles.
Yet, the debate is cast as an effort to prove the other
side wrong; as if it would be impossible to prove
both sides right.
A multiplicity of technical methods can also
lead to elitism. The Logo language allowed Anne
and Alex to program in their own ways. but in many
educational settings Logo is defined as the computer
language for children who have not reached the top
stage in Piaget's hierarchy. In such settings even as
sophisticated a thinker as Anne or as creative a
thinker as Alex would get their liberty at the cost of
having their intellects defined as immature. Similarly,
the very success ofthe Macintosh has often been cast
in terms that reflect the elitism of the dominant
computer culture. The Macintosh iconic interface
has been marketed as "the computer for the rest of
us:' with the implication that the rest of us need
things made simple and do not want to be bothered
with technical things.
As it happens, the popularity of icons may be
settling this argument. a conclusion which has many
interpretations. Thedesignersofcomputerinterfaces
might interpret it as final proof of the technical
superiority oficons. A psychologist might read it as
a challenge to the concrete/formal split; perhaps
most people are concrete thinkers most of the time ,
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and formal thinking is used for acceptability or
prestige or functionality. Others might simply say
that icons are "easier." Individually. these positions
do not support pluralism. What is important here is
whether the support for icons is part of a larger shift
towards an acceptance ofconcrete ways of thinking .
If the shift goes far it will be through the
connection of the icons to something deeper. a
philosophy of"object oriented programming.t'O In
the traditional concept of a program, the unit of
thought is an instruction to the computer to do
something. In object oriented programming the unit
of thought is creating and modifying interactive
agents within a program for which the natural
metaphors are biological and social rather than
algebraic. The elements of the program interact as
would actors on a stage. This style of programming
is not only more congenial to those who favor
'concrete approaches, but it puts an intellectual value
on a way of thinking that is resonant with their own.
In principle it could undermine thecanonical position
in at least two ways: first. within the world of
programming through legitimating alternative
methods; second, in the larger intellectual culture,
by supporting trends in cognitive theory thai
challenge the traditional canon.
Until recently. prevailing models of cognitive
theory have bolstered the commitment of
psychologists and educators to the superiority of
algorithmic and formal thinking. They were given
support by the cognitive theorists most influential in
the computer world, the leaders of the artificial
intelligence community. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, the model of Al with the greatest visibility
was [he rule-based "expert system" with its model of
mind as a structured information processor. Critics
of how computers influence the way we think cited
the information processing model as demonstrating
the instrumental reason and the lack of ambiguitr
allegedly inherent in all computational thinking
about intelligence.43 Artificial intelligence is not II
unitary enterprise, however. and recently, another
model has become increasingly prominent'
"emergent A"I.44
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Emergent AIdoes not suggest that the computer
be given rules to follow but tries to set up a system
of independent elements within a computer from
whose interactionsintelligence isexpected toemerge.
Its sustaining images are drawn not from the logical
bUI from thebiological and social Familiesofneuron-
like entities or societies of anthropomorphized
subminds and sub-subminds are in simultaneous
interaction from which mind-likeprocess is expected
to emerge. These models are sometimes theorized in
notions of "mind as society," where negotiational
processes are placed at the heart of all thinking.
Those who espouse and support such models are far
more inclined to find bricolage acceptable than are
classical Piagetians. What concerns us here, is not
making value judgments about these trends in AI.
just as we are not advocating a choice between the
use of icons and the use of textual instructions in
computer operating systems. What doe s concern us
is that the new trends - icons, object-oriented
programming. actor languages, society of mind,
emergent AI · all create an intellectual climate in the
computer world which undermines the idea that
fonnal methods are the only legitimate methods.
Thus. recent technological developments, in
interfaces, programming philosophy, and artificial
intelligence, have created an opening for
epistemological pluralism. We began by presenting
the notion ofepistemological pluralism by reference
to three streams of thought - feminism, ethnography
ofscience,and psychology - which,althoughdifferenI
in many ways, converge in reasserting the importance
of objects in thinking. We close by noting the
opportunity for new alliances between them and
computation.
Louis Althusser writes about psychoanalysis
lhattheimportantbreakthrough was not any particular
statement about the mind, but the step ofrecognizing
the unconscious as an object of study that defines a
new theoretical enterprise.4S Psychology long had
considered the rational and the conscious as the
quintessential mental activity; Sigmund Freud shifted
the ground to the irrational and the unconscious. The
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unconscious was not given recognition as only an
important factor. but rather became an object of
science in its own right Similarly, we imagine the
emergence of a science of thought which would
recognize the concrete as its central object
There isevery reason to thinkthat the revaluation
of the concrete will open the computer culture to
accepting the computer as an expressive medium
which encourages distinctive and varied styles of
usc.There is everyreason to think that this pluralistic
computer culture could be more welcoming and
nunuring to women and to men. Gilligan has said
that women can protect the recognition "of the
continuing imponance of attachment in human
life:>46 The evidence from our research on
programming styles leads us to conclude with an
analogous speculation. Feminist scholarship could
make a crucial contribution to the (until now)
predominantly male computerculture by promoting
the recognition ofthediverse ways that people think
about and appropriate formal systems and by
encouraging the acceptance ofour profound human
connection with our tools.
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